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FACTOR MARKET  BARRIERS  ARE TRADE BARRIERS: 
GAINS  FROM  TRADE  IN 1992 
ABSTRACT 
The European Community's economic integration by  1992 is predicted to have large 
economic  benefits.  According to traditional trade theory, the gains will come  only with 
permanent resource migration and significant factor price changes (since in principle all trade 
barriers have already been removed).  Yet, it seems unlikely that  the 1992 reforms will be 
completed, if they do indeed result in factor movements large enough  to substantially  alter 
factor rewards. 
This paper presents a more optimistic  view.  It  argues  that factor market integration 
can  result in economic  gains, even without capital and labor migration.  The basic argument 
is simple.  For some types of goods, it is cheaper to conduct trade on an intra—firm  basis, 
rather than an inter—firm basis (for instance roughly half of US imports are intra—firm, 
Hellemner [1981]).  In such industries, any factor market barrier that raises the cost of foreign 
control of local firms also raises the cost of intra—firm  trade. Consequently,  removing  such 
barriers  can lead to gains from trade.  The 1.0.  trade literature points out that intra—firrn 
trade  requires direct  foreign  control which need  not involve direct  foreign  investment 
(Helpman  and Krugman [19851).  Therefore, 1992 can logically lead to gains from additional 
intra—firm  trade, with little additional capital or labor migration. 
Richard Baldwin 
Columbia University  Business School 
New  York, NY  10027 I. Introduction 
The approach of 1992,  the target date for the European Community's much touted 
economic integration, has elicited a number of rather extravagant  claims on the part of 
pan—Europeanists  concerning the benefits of a single European market.'  The move, they 
assert,  will result in higher productivity,  more efficient allocation of  resources, higher living 
standards and enhanced export competitiveness. 
In the context of traditional trade theory, these claims appear exaggerated.  In 
principle, all trade barriers have already been  removed between the European Community 
(EC) nations, and factor prices are already approximately equal —  at least among the 
original six member countries.  With no tariffs and equal facior prices, the Heckshcerhiin 
model predicts that factor market liberalization should have  no effect.  Indeed this is one of 
the principle lessons  of the model.  Trade  in goods  is a substitute  for trade in factors. 
Recognizing, however, that  there are wage differences  within the newly expanded EC, 
we should expect efficiency  gains from the 1992 program.  Yet according to traditional trade 
theory (as extended by the Mundell—Jones  factor  mobility model), these gains will come  only 
with  rather  massive, and permanent, labor migration from the mw wage "southern" members, 
and capital outflow from the  northern  members.  Moreover, if the liberalization is to lead 
firms to choose a more efficient international  allocation of resources, it must necessarily alter 
factor prices. 
While such international  resource migration would undoubtedly result in the predicted 
economic benefits, it seems unlikely that this is what policy  makers have  in mind,  Indeed it is 
doubtful that the reforms would  be completed if they result in factor  movements large enough 
to significantly alter factor rewards.  Thus an analyst using the traditional framework should 
be rather pessimistic about the outcome of the 1992 program.  In that framework, economic 
gains come only with politically difficult factor  migration. 
This paper presents a more optimistic  view.  It argues that factor market integration 
can result in the economic  gains discussed above, even without capital and labor migration. 
The basic argument is simple.  For some types of goods,  international  vertical integratation  is essential to efficient  international  trade.  That is to say, for such goods it is cheaper to 
conduct trade on an intra—firm basis, rather than an inter—firm  basis.  In such industries, 
those factor  market harriers which raise the cost of foreign control of local assets have the 
effect of raising the cost of trade.  Consequently, removing such barriers can lead to gains 
from trade.  The industrial organization literature  stresses that the key aspect of vertical 
integration is control, not investment.  Therefore, while the removal of such barriers may 
increase international vertical integration, it need not involve international capital mobility 
(see for instance Helpman and Krugman [1985]). 
As noted by Bhagwati [1982], the point that barriers  to capital mobility may act as 
non—tariff barriers arose in the debate over "invisible" Japanese trade barriers.  While 
Bhagwati [1982] is skeptical of the validity of this contention, he examines the welfare effects 
of  freer capital mobility when capital mobility reduces implicit protection.  In particular he 
demonstrates that this aspect of capital flows implies that a country can gain from capital 
exports (even when they are by themselves directly unprofitable) due to the welfare gain from 
freer trade in goods engendered by the capital exports. 
The present paper  differs  from Bhagwati [1982] in three respects.  We focus on 
international vertical control rather than limiting  ourselves to foreign direct investment.  We 
explicitly model the manner in which factor market barriers are barriers to trade.  Lastly, our 
analysis is done in the context of an intra—industry trade model (Krugman [19791), rather 
than the standard factor abundance trade model as in l3hagwati. 
The rest of the paper is divided into five parts.  The second section examines the 
general proposition that some factor  market barriers are barriers  to trade.  Section three lays 
out an explicit, single firm example to formalize the symmetry between trade barriers  and 
factor market barriers.  The next section presents a simple general equilibrium trade model 
and derives the equilibrium with factor  market barriers.  The fourth  section studies the 
comparative statics of  removing the factor market barriers.  The last section contains a 
summary and concluding remarks. 3 
II. gie Factor Market Barriers Act as Barriers to Trade 
In this section we consider a general  model  of a domestic firm which exports a product 
to a foreign  country.  We assume that  manufacture of the good is concentrated in the home 
country (due, for example, to factor  prices difference, technology differences, or economy of 
scales).  Sale of the good to foreign consumers requires more than just physical manufacture. 
We assume that in order to sell the product, additional services must be provided.  These 
services are intended to represent "support"  or "consumer" services such as maintenence and 
repair services, as well as marketing and distribution costs.  As such, we assume that the 
provision of these services must take place in the foreign country.  We refer to these services 
as downstream services.  This necessity of downstream services limits the types of goods  to 
which our argument applies. 
We assume that the firm has the option of organizing its exports via international 
vertical ntegiation or arm's—length  trading. In the first case the home firm which 
manufactures the good is unrelated to the foreign  firm which provides the downstream 
services.  In the second, the two firms are under a common direction (here we arbitrarily 
assume that it is the home firm that controls the foreign).  The first case is inter—firm  trade, 
the second is intra—firm  trade. 
Next we address the nature of the factor market barriers which may act as trade 
barriers.  Virtually all industrial economies have a multitude of barriers to factor market 
integration.  The employment of foreign managers and skilled workers  (even by foreign firms) 
is typically subject to a plethora  of red—tape requirements, bureaucratic delays and/or 
taxation (if not outright prohibition).  If these workers are important  to the efficient control 
and operation of  foreign affiliates, then such labor market barriers raise the cost of exporting. 
Similarly, the control and ownership of assets by foreign companies usually faces a whole 
array of restrictions and costly regulat ions. 
International differences in laws concerning patents, licensing, franchising and other 
forms of vertical constraint can similarly inhibit international vertical integration.  Also  in 4 
this category of barriers to trade—related MNC activity are national anti—trust, and merger 
and acquisition policies  which discriminate  against foreigners. 
There are probably interesting insights to be gained from explicitly modeling the 
manner in which each of these barriers raises the costs of foreign  control of local firms. 
However to make our general point as clearly as possible, we simply assume that the net effect 
of these barriers is to raise the cost of providing the downstream services when the local firm 
is controlled by a foreign  firm.  In particular,  we consider two categories of these cost raising 
harriers:  those which raise the marginal cost of providing downstream services when the 
foreign firm is controlled by a home firm, and those which raise the fixed cost of controlling a 
foreign firm from the home country. 
We presume that vertical integration  occurs when the sum of profits of the two firms 
operating independently, fl,  is less than the sum of  profits when the firms are under a 
common direction, l1'I.  We can write this as the vertical integration contraint: 
(1)  fivi> 11al  where 
al 
= argmax [TM[x]  + 
zD[y]], st. y= f(x,z) 
Fl  = argmax  I  lxii + argmax r  Eyii, s.t. y = f(x,z) 
x  L  y 
where  and  are the profits of the manufacturer and downstream firms, a and y are the 
choice variables of the two firms, and f is the production function describing the 
transformation of the manufactured good into a saleable final good (a represents all other 
inputs). 
The next section presents an explicit model in which (1) holds due to the well known 
K—C—A quasi—rent  motive for vertical integration.  Any one of many other vertical 
integration motives could have been used.  Blair and Kaserman [1983] describe five basic 
vertical integration motives: K—C—A's  quasi—rent,  incomplete contracts,  sequential market 
power, implicit insurance and transaction  costs. 5 
We are now ready to consider the two categories of barriers,  Given  that the vertical 
integration constraint holds, the total cost of selling to the foreign country is: 
*  * 
(2)  C[yl = ( c[y] + F ) + ( c  ['1('+i3) + F (1+A) ) 
where 3 and A represent the cost—raising effect  of the first and second category of barriers, 
$  *  . 
c  [y, F and F  are the cost functions and fixed costs associated with manufacturing and 
the downstream services respectively. 
We turn first to the barriers represented by 3.  /3 raises  the marginal cost of exporting. 
This follows from differentiation of (2) with respect to y.  /3 will therefore  reduce  trade in any 
model where the firm's sales are decreasing in marginal costs.  This is a property of sales in 
models employing a broad class of technologies and market structures  (the section three model 
provides an example).  In such models, the barriers reduce the volume of trade by increasing 
the marginal cost of trade. 
Barriers which raise the fixed cost of controlling a home firm from abroad are also 
trade barriers,  assuming only that the market structure  is such that price of the final good is 
positively related to average costs.  For example allowing free entry  and ignoring the integer 
constraint,  we have that price equals average cost, in equilibrium.  Since this category of 
barriers raises average costs, it raises prices  and so leads to less trade. 
A. Caveats and Discussion 
The main result depends crucially on three points: (i) downstream services must be 
located in the foreign country, (ii) the vertical integration constraint  must hold, and (iii) the 
factor market barriers  must raise the cost of providing the downstream service. 
The first caveat that should be mentioned is that the result can only  be expected to 
hold for certain types of goods.  For many types of goods  , the marketing  and distribution can 
he efficiently performed by firms that are unrelated to the manufacturer.  Inexpensive 
apparel, processed foods and certain consumer electronics are some examples of such goods. 
For these types of goods the barriers inhibit MNCs but do not inhibit trade since the 6 
downstream service can be efficiently provided by locally owned firms which is not subject to 
the barrier. 
Also for some types  of products, there is no need  to provide downstream services. 
Again, for such products the symmetry of factor market barriers and trade barriers  would 
breakdown.  Since in these industries MNC activity  is not essential to trade, barriers to 
MNCs need  not affect trade. 
We assumed that the factor market barriers could be translated into a cost raising 
effect.  Absolute quantitative  restrictions  would  probably lead to similar results but  more 
complicated analytics.  In the case of the Leontief relationship between manufacturing and 
downstream services, a quantitative  restriction on foreign ownership of downstream assets 
implies a quantitative  restriction on imports.  In which case they obviously constitute  barriers 
to trade.  Nonetheless, in general the effects of quantative  restriction on trade are quite 
sensitive to assumptions on market structure and strategic choice variables (Krishna  [1985]). 
It is conceivable that a high enough /3 or A would make arm's—length  trading less 
costly than vertical integration.  For such high levels of /3 or A, the downstream  servives 
would  be provided by unrelated, local firms.  Small changes in /3 and A  would therefore not 
affect  trade.  What this argues is that since vertical integration is only one possible 
organizational form, there is an upper bound to the trade—inhibiting  effects of $ and  A. 
Nonetheless, complete removal of /3 and  A would have the trade effects similar to those of 
tariff reductions. 
III. An Explicit Single Firm Examvle 
The model we employ combines elements of the headquarter services model of MNCs 
(Helpman and Krugman [1985])  and the beachhead or sunk  cost model (Baldwin [1986]).  A 
number of  highly special assumptions are made in order to focus attention on the essential 
economics of the problem. 
Consider a firm producing a differentiated product for sale to two identical countries. 7 
Physical manufacture  of the good is subject to increasing returns and so is concentrated  in one 
country (which we call the home country without loss of generality).  The economies of scale 
take the form of the standard fixed—cost—plus—constant—marginal—-cost variety.  Production 
of the final good,  however, requires more than just physical manufacture.  We assume that in 
order to sell the product  to either market, the firm must also incur additional costs.  These 
costs represent the downstream services discussed in the previous section. 
To provide these downstream services, the firm must control assets that are completely 
distinct from those involved in physical manufacturing.  We make two important assumptions 
on the nature of these downstream assets.  First, due to the differentiated nature of the good, 
the downstream assets are firm—specific.  In other words the physical and human capital 
necessary  to provide the services is particular  to the good and is therefore sunk.  Second,  since 
the assets are aimed at providing services to consumers, they must be located in the same 
country as the consumers.  Thus the firm must aquire these assets in both the home and 
loreign country if it wishes to sell to both markets,  Photocopiers, farm machinery and 
automobiles are some examples of products that require in-country servicing and distribution 
facilities. 
To keep things simple, we assume that production of the final good requires a fixed 
coeficient combination of manufacturing and downstream services.  Lastly, we assume that 
the provision of the consumer services is subject to constant returns. 
A. Vertical Integration Motive 
As has been stressed in the 1.0. trade literature,  any model of MNC activity must 
answer two questions: 1) Why does production of the final good involve assets in more than 
one country?  and 2) Why are the assets  (which are located in different countries) owned by 
the same firm instead of by two unrelated firms? 
In this model the nature of the product answers the first question.  The production of 
the final good requires two types of assets: those involved in the provision of consumer 
services, and those involved in physical manufacturing.  Due to scale economies  in 
manufacturing  assets are located in a only one country.  Due to the nature of consumer 8 
services,  distribution  and repair  facilities must be located in both countries. 
The answer to the second question comes from the nature of the assets.  In particular  it 
is due to the specificity of the downstream assets.  As Klein, Crawford and Alchia.n  [1982] 
originally showed,  the specificity of assets  creates quasi—rents.  Quasi—rents  imply that 
arm's—length trade in the manufactured good and the downstream service is an organizational 
form that  is inferior (i.e., more costly) to vertical integratation.  Helpman and Krugman 
[1985] apply the Klein—Crawford—Alchian  (K—C—A)  logic to explain the vertical integratation 
of internationally  disperse assets, i.e., the existence of MNCs. 
The basic  K—C—A idea  is quite simple.  The specificity of the assets implies that they 
are sunk.  Once they are sunk, they create rent ( K—C—A call this quasi-rent since it is only 
rent ex post, not ex ante).  Dispute over the division of this rent and strategies undertaken  in 
anticipation of this dispute lead to inefficencies  which can be avoided by internalizing the 
rent—division  problem.  Of course vertical integration need not occur if one is willing to make 
the extreme assumption that the firms can costlessly  write complete and credible contracts. 
We suppose that such contracts  are not available. 
Next  we turn to the factor  market barriers.  As in the previous section, we assume that 
the net affect of these barriers is to raise the home firm's cost of providing the downstream 
services  in the foreign market.  Moreover, we assume that the barriers raise the marginal costs 
of doing so.  Thus the marginal cost of providing the downstream services  is d in the home 
country and d(1+fi) in tbe foreign country (since in the foreign country  the assets  are 
controlled by the home firm).  We interprete flas the shadow price of factor market barriers. 
In most industrialized countries, factor market barriers  are not intended to raise 
government revenue.  To model this we assume that the fi  represents "frictional" barriers. 
That is to say, the barriers do nothing but raise the cost of foreign control of local assets. 
Assuming that  results in some government revenue would not alter any of the results in this 
partial equilibrium analysis. 
B. Some Barriers to Factor Market Integration Trade Barriers 
We are now ready to examine the problem of the firm and derive our main result.  The 9 
firm has a monopoly in the market for its own differentiated product.  To facilitate the 
comparison of factor market barriers and standard trade barriers,  we assume that the value of 
exports (when it crosses the border) is subject to an ad valorum tariff of r percent.  Thus the 
marginal cost of exporting must include the tariff.  The firm chooses domestic price and 
export price subject to demand functions in order to maximize profits.  Thus: 
(3)  max  px+px—cx+c(1+T)x—dxd(1+/3)xF 
where F is the fixed cost of manufacturing, c is the marginal cost of manufacturing, x is 
domestic sales and x  ts export sales.  The first order conditions (we assume that  the demand 
functions are such that interior solutions occur) are: 
(Ia)  px'[p] + x  =  (c + d)x'[p] 
(4b)  +  =  + d(1+3)]x[p*1 
These equations together with the two identical demand functions determine the trade volume 
and price as well as home sales and price.  Simply  re—arranging  the first order conditions we 
get: 
(5a)  p  =  —  f(X))(c  + d) 
(5b)  Ps = ( 
1  , )(c(1+r) + d(1+)) 
1  —  1/f(x ) 
* 
where we allow the demand elasticities,  and  to be a function of the level of sales.  Sales 
are simply: (6a)  x  =  - 1[e(x) 
+ d)] 
*  r 
1 
(6b)  x  = xj(  ; )(c(1+r) + d(1+3)) 
—  1/(x 
Equations (5b) and (6b) demonstrate our main result.  The shadow price of factor 
market barriers  affect trade in the  same way tariffs do.  That is to say, in this model factor 
market barriers  act as trade barriers.  In particular  rand 3 both affect the marginal cost of 
exporting.  Of course, r  falls only  on the value  of the product  that crosses the border, while 
ta.lls only on the value added in—country.  As a  result, increases in rand j3 will have  identical 
trade  effects  only if c=d.  This can be seen by inspection of (5b) and (6b). 
To reiterate,  when MNC activity  is essential to international  trade, barriers to the 
MNC activity constitute barriers to trade. 
IV. A Two Country—Two  Industry  Model 
The model combines elements of the model in the previous section with the Krugman 
{1980j model of trade.  Specifically  we consider two identical countries which have no explicit 
trade barriers  between them but which do have factor  market barriers of the type discussed in 
the previous section. 
Again to streamline the algebra, we make a number of highly special assumptions.  We 
suppose that labor is the only fixed factor of production and there are only two industries. 
The first (the x sector) consists of Spence—Dixit-—Stiglitz differentiated products.2 These 
goods are produced according to the technology outlined in the previous section, namely 
increasing returns in physical production and constant returns in downstream services.  The 
market structure is assumed to be Chamberlain monopolistic competition with price as the 
strategic variable.  The other industry produces a homogeneous good (referred to as A) 
subject to constant return to scale and perfect competition.  We employ the convenient fiction 11 
of a representative consumer (in each country) who is endowed with t/2 units of labor. 
Tastes in each country are defined by the utility function: 
(7)  U = ((E  X)l/O)a(A)(la) 
where 2 is the set of x varieties produced.  Taking the labor as the numeraire, the world 
demand functions arising from utility maximization in both countries are: 
(8)  A = p (I—a)t 
and 
(9a)  x. =  at,  for a typical home variety, 
and 
*  —e 
* 
(9b)  =  at, for a typical imported variety, 
p. 
iEc) 
where f  is  the set of varieties that are actually produced. 
The elasticity of demand for a single variety of x is an important parameter in the 
model.  With each monopolistic competitor taking all other prices as given, the exact demand 
elasticity for variety k with respect to its price is: 
p1—0 
(10)  =  0 + (1—9)(  ). 
p. 
iEf2 
In a symmetric equilibrium this is 0 +  , where m is the total number of  varieties sold. 
Following Helpman and Krugman [19851, we assume  that there are many varieties so firms 
ignore the second term and act as if e = 0. 12 
A. The "A" Industry 
Production of a unit uf the A good requires "a" units of labor in physical manufacture. 
Additionally it requires downstream services that involve 'b" units of labor if the downstream 
services are provided by locally  owned firms,  and b(1+fl) units of labor if they are provided by 
a firm that is controlled from abroad.  As in the previous section, 8 is the shadow price of the 
frictional regulations and restrictions on international control of human and physical assets. 
Since the A good is a homogeneous  product,  there is no rent—division  problem to 
motivate vertical integration.  That is, since the downstream assets can service  any  A 
manufacturer's output, the owners are not open to ex post exploitation by any single 
manufacturer. 
Given this technology, perfect competition implies that there is no MNC activity in 
the A good (so the downstream services are provided by local firms that are unrelated to the 
manufactures) and its price is: 
(11)  pa=a+b. 
Given (11), the demand function implies world output  of A is (1—a)t/(a+b). Consequently 
(1—a)t units of the world labor endowment are employed in the production of A.  Given the 
symmetry of the two countries, there need be no trade in A. 
B. The x Industry 
rrhe problem of a typical firm in industry x is similar to the one described in the 
previous section.  It chooses domestic and export prices to maximize profits, and thus its first 
order conditions are identical to (4a) and (4b), with r = ft.  That is, the price of each 
imported variety of x is given by (4b).  The price of each domestically produced variety is 
given by (4a).  Using the demand functions, local and export sales (for both home and foreign 
firms) are respectively: 13 
1  1—1/c  I 1.aj  x•  = lfn)I  a 
1  + (1+)1_ 
c  + d 
and 
i I')L\  *  ,  1  1 —  1/c  Xi = k'Ifl)'. 
1 
A  + d(1+1) a 
+ 
where 1+  (  c+  d(1+)  ), so that  is the percent by which the factor market barriers 
increase the marginal cost of export versus local sales.  By symmetry (lOa) and (lOb) describe 
the domestic and export sales of a typical firm in each country. 
To close the model we must determine the equilibrium number of varieties of x 
produced in each country, n.  Assuming free entry into the x industry and ignoring the integer 
constraint,  firms in each country enter up to the point where profits are zero.  To calculate 
the level of profits leaving out fixed costs, we rewrite (4a) and (4b) as, p(1—1/e)=(c+d), 
* 
p 1—1/c)=(c+d)(1+i).  Adding and rearranging these equations, we get: 
*  ** 
[p —(c+d)]x + [p —(c+d)(1+4)]x  = (lfc)(px  + p x  ). 
This  shows that  at  the maximium, operating  profits are a fraction of revenue (the fraction 
depends only on the perceived demand elasticity).  Given the symmetry of all x firms, it must 
be that the revenue of a typical x firm is one 2n—th (where n is the number of firms) of the 
world wide expenditure on x.  World expenditure is on x is a r  in this model,  so 
F = (l/c)(oEj2n). Clearly then n is given by: 
(13) 
To be certain that the model is closed by (13), we must address the issue of the 
possibility of revenue associated with the factor market barriers.  Here our assumption that 
represents  'frictional'  regulations and restrictions (and thus does not give rise to any 
government revenue) becomes important. If fidid lead to government revenue, all results 
would  go through as long as the revenue was returned in a lump—sum fashion to consumers. 14 
Waira& law implies that total world labor demand equals E. 
C. Description of the Equilibrium 
In summary we have Krugman—type intra—industry  trade in the x industry,  but no 
* 
trade in A.  By symmetry, trade is balanced and the imports of each country are nx  Total 
domestic sales of x by local firms is nx.  Simple manipulation of  (5a), (5b), (6a) and (6b) 
implies  that the domestic share of total x industry sales in each country is equal to: 
(14)  flX  = ( 
1  e 
npx  +  npx  1  + (1+) 
Note that this share is greater than  1/2 and increasing in  (and thus )  since  9 > 1.  A 
convenient measure of import penetration is simply (1—oP). 
In addition  to intra—industry trade, there is two—way MNC activity in the same 
industry.  In other words there is intra—industry  foreign direct investment (IIFDI)  in the x 
industry.  Given the Leontief combination of manufacturing and downstream services in the x 
industry, the share of downstream firms controlled by foreign firms is also given by (1—o). 
In this model we can be completely agnostic about the issue of the international 
mobility of factors.  The symmetry and lack of trade barriers implies  that MNC activity need 
not involve the physical movement of labor.  Our vertical integration motive merely requires 
that the manufacturing and downstream service assets be controlled by a single  firm. 
To focus as sharply as possible on the difference between this model  and the 
Mundell—Jones  model, we make an extreme assumption.  We assume that (as in the 
Helpman—Krugman  [1985] headquarter services MNC model) foreign control of local assets is 
possible without any physical migration of labor.  In other words, MNC activity involves only 
direct foreign control, not investment,  Nonetheless, we could have assumed that some 
migration of labor is necessary  to MNC activity without changing any of the analytics or 
results.  All such migration would be two-way  migration.  That is, there would  be no net 
migration. 15 
V. The Comparative Statics of RemovinE Factor Market Barriers 
Given the equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section, it is easy to study the 
comparative statics of removing the factor  market barriers.  The key is to note that if j3 = 0 
then $ = 0, and the model becomes  completely symmetric.  In the x sector, the domestic and 
export prices become the same.  Nothing changes in the A sector since nothing depended on /3 
in that sector. 
In general, the complete removal of discriminatory government policies  need  not imply 
that  equals zero,  Foreign control of local assets may be more expensive than local control 
due to differences in language, culture and social institutions.  However,  to simplify the 
analytics we study the comparative static effects of  changing /3 from a positive  number  to 
zero. It is important to note that  what we are comparing are two equilibria, not the move 
from one equilibrium to another.  The presence of beachhead—type  sunk  costs implies 
hysteresis in trade (Baldwin [19861).  Thus removing 3 may have  effects that differ from those 
predicted by comparative statics (more on this in the conclusion). 
A. Positive Effects 
To evaluate the positive effects of factor  market liberalization, we examine the 
equilibrium condition in section III for  = 0.  By inspection of equations (8) and (11), there 
is no change in the output, price or trade pattern of A.  There are, however,  many changes in 
the x industry.  These are: 
* 
1)  the export price of x, p , falls, 
2) the domestic price of x, p,  is unchanged, 
3)  there is no change in the equilibrium number of firms,  n. 
Points 1,  2 and 3 can be seen by inspection of (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b) and (13).  Also, 
4) the volume (nx*) of exports  (which equals imports by symmetry) rises, 
5) the volume of local x sales by domestic firms (nx) falls. 
Equations (2a) and (2b) together with point 3 above, imply points 4 and 5.  Also, 
6) our measure of import penetration  (1—u) rises to 1/2, 16 
** 
7) the value of exports (np x  ) rises. 
Point 6 is obvious in equation (14).  To see point 7, we multiply equation (9b) by p, and use 
**  0-1-1 
(5b) to get: p  x  = (t/n)(1 + (1+4,)  )  Inspection of this expression demonstrates 
point 7.  Next, 
* 
8) total output  per firm (x + x  ) rises, 
9) measured labor productivity (output per worker) rises. 
Point 8 is easy to show.  Recall that optimal revenue is 1/c times operating profits.  With free 
entry, operating profits must equal F.  Thus rearranging the zero—profit condition produces: 
* 
F = F/f —(c+d)(x + x (1+4,)).  Clearly then the typical firm's total output must be higher 
when 4, = 0 than when  4, > 0.  Point  9 follows  directly from point 8 together with the fixed 
cost nature of the scale economies. 
Next we examine the effects that setting 4, = 0 has on factor  migration and MNC 
activity.  Here there are two basic points: 
10) the liberalization need  not involve labor migration, and 
11) the degree of two-way MNC activity  increases. 
The tenth point is obvious from the symmetry of the two countries and our assumption that 
control need  involve no labor movement.  The eleventh point follows directly from point 6.  If 
(1—q) of all local sales are made by foreign firms, then (1—a) of the downstream service 
facilities must be controlled by foreigners (recall 1—c = 1/2 with  4, = 0, but is less than  1/2 
with 4,> 0). 
Points 1 —9 state that the 1992 program could logically  increase productivity, export 
performance. and allow neater economies  of scale without causing any factor  migration. 
B. Welfare Effects 
The major result of section II is that a factor  market barrier,  fi, acts like a trade 
barrier.  In general, the welfare effect of removing trade barriers is ambiguous.  Consumers 
benefit through lower prices.  However,  due to Brander and Spencer [1981] reasoning, the loss 
in profits to domestic firms may more than outweigh the gains to consumers.  Moreover, in 
general the liberalization may entail the exit of some firms,  reducing the number of varieties 17 
available.  In this paper, however, we have made assumptions that have the effect of removing 
these ambiguities. 
Specifically, our assumption of free entry and abstraction  from the integer constraint 
removes the possibility of rents.  The choice  of the Cobb—Douglas  upper—tier  utility function 
and constant perceived elasticity  implies that the total number of available varieties is 
unaffected by the liberalization.  Consequently, in this paper mutual removal of factor market 
barriers improves welfare in both countries.  Furthermore,  it does so without any factor 
migration.  This statement follows from the fact that removing /3 does not change the output 
of A nor the number of varieties but does result in higher x industry  output (point 8).  Clearly 
then the utility of the representative consumer in each county is increased. 
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The principle result  of this paper is that for some types of products, barriers  to foreign 
control of local facilities represent barriers to trade.  Consequently, removal of factor  market 
harriers which boost the cost of  foreign control of home firms can result in gains from trade: 
higher productivity,  more efficient  allocation of resources, higher living standards  and 
enhanced export competitiveness.  At least in principle, these gains can be realized without 
any  factor migration. 
The results in this paper  raise two additional interesting issues.  First is the issue of 
how large the effects are likely to be in practice.  While this sort of empirical work is crucial, 
it  is unlikely to be straightforward.  Mon—marginal changes together  with imperfect 
competition and economies of  scale, make empirical work difficult.  The computable general 
equilibrium modelling (see Harris and Cox [1982]) methodology would appear to be the most 
promising approach. 
The second issue is that of dynamics.  Comparative statics provides a reasonable guess 
as to where the liberalization will eventually take the EC.  However, for policy—making the 
adjustment  path is often as important as the eventual goal.  Recent work on trade adjustment 18 
suggests that the presence of in—country  sunk  costs imply non—standard dynamics. 
Specifically  in the presence of such costs, trade flows and prices are subject to hysteresis (see 
Baldwin [1986 and 1988), Baldwin and Krugman [1988], Dixit [1978a and 1987bJ).  Again the 
Harris—Cox simulation approach may prove to be the only way to get a handle on the 
dynamics of adjustment. F000UCJES 
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